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Abstract
Abusers increasingly use spyware apps, account compro-
mise, and social engineering to surveil their intimate partners,
causing substantial harms that can culminate in violence. This
form of privacy violation, termed intimate partner surveillance
(IPS), is a profoundly challenging problem to address due to
the physical access and trust present in the relationship be-
tween the target and attacker. While previous research has
examined IPS from the perspectives of survivors, we present
the first measurement study of online forums in which (po-
tential) attackers discuss IPS strategies and techniques. In
domains such as cybercrime, child abuse, and human traffick-
ing, studying the online behaviors of perpetrators has led to
better threat intelligence and techniques to combat attacks.
We aim to provide similar insights in the context of IPS. We
identified five online forums containing discussion of moni-
toring cellphones and other means of surveilling an intimate
partner, including three within the context of investigating
relationship infidelity. We perform a mixed-methods analysis
of these forums, surfacing the tools and tactics that attack-
ers use to perform surveillance. Via qualitative analysis of
forum content, we present a taxonomy of IPS strategies used
and recommended by attackers, and synthesize lessons for
technologists seeking to curb the spread of IPS.
1 Introduction
Technology-based intimate partner surveillance (IPS) causes
immense harms. A discrete form of intimate partner violence
(IPV), IPS is the deliberate surveillance of an intimate partner
with or without their knowledge, levied through technical and
non-technical methods. Survivors have reported their abusers
use spyware apps, account compromise, GPS trackers, shared
cellular plans, and more to monitor their digital lives and
physical locations [18, 19, 32, 41, 46]. Prior work has also
indicated that a wealth of IPS apps are available online [6]
and in active use against victims [17, 22, 39].
To better protect targets of abuse, we need to both im-
prove technologies’ robustness to abuse and better inform
interventional approaches that directly aid victims [17, 22].
To achieve these aspirations, however, we need to better un-
derstand how those interested in perpetrating IPS learn to
conduct these attacks. To date, there have been few inves-
tigations into how attackers locate the resources that help
them enact abuse. Chatterjee et al. [6] highlight that blogs,
videos, and question-and-answer sites exist online that help
facilitate IPS, but stop short of investigating the communities
who make use of them. There is a methodological hurdle in
discovering this information: we need a way to hear from
potential attackers directly.
In this work, we provide the first study exploring how po-
tential attackers use the Internet to learn how to enact IPS
against their victims. We identify a set of five public, online fo-
rums where people discuss infidelity in intimate relationships
and tools for monitoring cellphones. We build a crawler to re-
trieve the conversations on these forums and use it to compile
a dataset containing over 200 K posts spread across almost
20 K threads. This dataset contains an unprecedented amount
of information about the strategies of IPS attackers, contextu-
alized in user-generated natural language. While prior work
has described the attacks experienced by victims, we present a
detailed view of how these attacks are created and developed—
the capabilities attackers seek, the vulnerabilities they exploit,
and the community dynamics that enable them.
We analyze this data using mixed-methods. We begin with
quantitative measurements of the forums, their users, and their
posting behaviors. These analyses reveal that most forums
contain “superusers” involved with a disproportionately large
fraction of threads. For two of the five forums, we discover
that their content consists almost entirely of spam advertising
particular spyware tools, in a manner that may be consistent
with search engine optimization (SEO) techniques deployed
by the creators of those tools. We also determine that many of
their most highly viewed threads are about technology-based
IPS, suggesting these forums have generated a significant
audience for IPS-related content.
We then perform qualitative coding of a large sample of
750 threads (250 from each of the three forums that are not
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inundated by spyware ads). Via thematic analysis [4], we
surface novel insights about the online behaviors of IPS at-
tackers. We show that potential attackers seek online support
for suspicions of infidelity, and that community members
respond by outlining exactly how to track, monitor, and other-
wise compromise the privacy of an intimate partner. We show
that discussion of IPS is prevalent in these forums, with one
forum having 78% of sampled threads related to IPS.
We develop a taxonomy of IPS attacks surfaced from the
suggestions made in these forums (Table 3). Tool-based
attacks directly weaponize technology such as audiovisual
recorders, keyloggers, backup recovery tools, and more, and
can be understood in two subcategories: those requiring phys-
ical access to a partner, and those that do not. Coercion and
subterfuge attacks manipulate a partner into unlocking their
devices or accounts. Finally, we see many suggestions to out-
source attacks by hiring private investigators.
Although some of these strategies have been reported by
victims [19, 32], our analysis provides the complementary
view of potential perpetrators. We highlight tools, tactics, and
services that have not been reported previously, and which we
believe were previously unknown to those helping victims.
We also report on the conversational patterns within these
forums that enable would-be attackers (what we describe
as escalation), and, conversely, patterns in which they are
discouraged away from IPS (de-escalation). These findings
suggest that public forums can serve as a source of threat
intelligence informing interventions to dissuade abuse.
In fact, our work is already having impact for IPS interven-
tions. We shared our results with the team running a clinic pro-
viding direct assistance to IPV survivors facing IPS [17, 22],1
who are working towards using our findings in their pro-
cedures. More broadly, our analyses yield insights for tech-
nologists, platforms, and advocates on how we might defend
against and mitigate the spread of IPS. We close by discussing
implications for platforms, future work in automated threat in-
telligence, and how policymakers might address the for-profit
operations that financially benefit from abuse.
2 Background and Related Work
IPV and technology abuse. Prior work has examined the be-
haviors, justifications, and tactics of intimate partner abusers
[23,27,43], including work identifying suspicions of infidelity
as a leading trigger for IPV in heterosexual couples [3, 36].
Of this literature, a growing body of work explores the role
of technology in IPV, including how abusers exploit tech-
nology to monitor, harass, control or otherwise harm their
targets [6, 11, 18, 19, 32, 41, 46]. Chatterjee et al. [6] ob-
served that abusers are likely exploiting easy-to-find online
resources, including tutorials, question-and-answer sites, and
videos explaining how to use spyware for IPS. Roundy et
1https://www.ipvtechresearch.org
al. [39] used datasets from a major antivirus vendor to explore
a broader class of creepware that includes spyware, but also
SMS bombers, hacking tutorials, and more. These works have
provided valuable intelligence for corresponding anti-IPS in-
terventions with victims and survivors [17, 22].
To date, however, less research has examined the role of
online communities in IPV. Some have examined how targets
experience IPV in digital media and seek support through
online forums [12, 30], but to the best of our knowledge, ours
is the first study to measure and analyze how forums lead
attackers to such tools. Our work confirms that attackers are
discussing and recommending IPS strategies on public forums
available to any Internet user. We also identify new tactics,
such as custom scripts to monitor websites visited and launch
man-in-the-middle attacks.
Online measurement studies. Prior work has used measure-
ment and analysis of online forums to shed light on commu-
nities discussing criminal or otherwise malicious behaviors.
For some of these communities, this research has led to the
development of threat intelligence.
Commercially motivated criminals, such as spammers and
black-hat hackers, use online forums as marketplaces and for
learning adversarial techniques from each other [16, 35, 45].
Research on this phenomenon has identified structure, trust,
and superusers in these communities [1, 2, 21]. Relatedly,
online forums used by pedophiles and others involved in
the creation and distribution of child sexual abuse materi-
als have been studied to gain insights into the way partici-
pants justify or normalize abuse, and share technical and non-
technical strategies that facilitate abuse [13]. Similar methods
have also been used to analyze forums associated with hate
groups [7, 38], cyberbullying [8, 29], doxxing [40], mis- and
disinformation campaigns [42], harassment [24, 25, 31], and
sex trafficking [37]. These measurement studies include ones
that directly document abuse (e.g., hate and harassment on so-
cial media), as well as those investigating perpetrators’ discus-
sions of tactics (e.g., perpetrators sharing ways to maximize
the emotional impact of harassing messages).
Our work falls in the latter category. While methodologi-
cally similar, we differ in our focus on people who use online
forums to discuss strategies for IPS. Similar to the work on cy-
bercrime and child abuse forums, analysis of online resources
such as craigslist and backpage has led to threat intelligence
that helped combat human trafficking [37]. We aim to have
a similar impact on IPS and IPV more broadly. In summary,
our research questions are:
• What role do online forums play in surfacing IPS resources
to potential attackers?
• What role do commercially motivated entities play in these
online communities?
• What tools and tactics are being suggested to potential
attackers, and at what levels of technical sophistication?
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3 Forums and Datasets
To answer these research questions, we perform a mixed-
methods analysis of a large sample of posts and threads from
public online forums with a high density of IPS-relevant con-
versation. In this section, we review our analysis targets and
data collection approach, as well as the resulting datasets.
Infidelity and IPS forums. We identified several forums
whose content includes a large number of posts touching on
IPS. These were discovered through a combination of pointers
from prior work [6] and online web searches using a com-
bination of terms such as “spyware track wife”. While we
endeavored to be exhaustive, we restricted attention only to
publicly available forums, excluding forums accessible only
to registered users or users who had crossed some threshold
number of active posts. We may also have missed forums
that are not easily found via search engines. Finally, many
forums have a small number of posts touching on IPS, but
with the overwhelming majority of content being irrelevant
to our study. We excluded those from our analysis and se-
lected forums that seemed to have a higher concentration of
IPS-related posts. Future work might explore techniques to
discover IPS-related forums that are harder to access and find.
Our analyses focus primarily on three forums that aim to
help people navigate infidelity. To prevent the publication of
this work from advertising spyware, or from unintentionally
impacting these public forums by convincing them to go
private, we anonymize them.2 The forums we study include:
• Forum A, a community dedicated to discussing “inves-
tigative equipment.” Forum A is a subforum of a website
providing resources on resolving marital conflicts with
Alexa rank approximately 500,000.
• Forum B, a community dedicated to advice on “detect-
ing infidelity and deception.” Forum B is a subforum of
a website providing resources on cheating in romantic
relationships, with Alexa rank approximately 900,000.
• Forum C, a moderated Reddit subforum that bills itself
as “a safe place to ask for advice and guidance” for those
facing infidelity in a relationship. As of February 2020, Fo-
rum C had approximately 80,000 subscribers, and Reddit
was the 18th most popular website in the world.3
We additionally investigated two subforums that focus on spy-
ware tools: Forums D and E, both subforums of a community
for cellphone advice. Forum D focuses on spyware for mobile
phones, while Forum E focuses on spyware generally. These
subforums surfaced in Internet searches for the same sets of
IPS-related keywords as those used to discover the three infi-
delity forums above. As we discuss further in Section 4, our
analysis concludes most content on these forums are spam
2Our data, including forum names, is available for research upon request.
3https://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/reddit.com. Alexa rankings
are based on global traffic and engagement over the last 90 days.
advertisements for particular spyware tools. For simplicity,
we will use the term “forum” to refer to the communities we
studied in-depth (e.g., Forum C), and “parent forum” to refer
to their parents where needed (e.g., Reddit).
Data collection. We collected data from Forums A, B, D
and E via custom crawlers built using Scrapy, an open-source,
Python-based framework for web scraping.4 Our crawlers
preserved the threaded structure of each forum’s content, as
well as metadata like views and post and update timestamps
where available. We did not download any media beyond
text—specifically avoiding images—and stored all data in a
local database on a secured server. Our analysis covers a set
of scrapes collected using this pipeline in October of 2019.
For Forum C, we used the scrape available via the Reddit
corpus within ConvoKit [5], which was collected in October
2018. Table 1 summarizes the complete dataset.
Limitations. Our study combines quantitative and qualita-
tive methodologies to characterize a sampling of publicly
available forums where discussion of IPS tactics manifests.
We emphasize our work may not generalize to discussion on
private forums, such as those that require the creation of an ac-
count and a threshold of posts or months active for access, or
those occurring within private social groups on larger social
media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. We also focus
on English-language forums, and thus our findings cannot
be taken to represent the scope of IPS discussion worldwide.
We believe there is compelling future research in investigat-
ing larger public-facing communities, like other subreddits or
closed communities on and off of influential social networks.
Ethics. Throughout this work, we were sensitive to the ethics
of using online discussions of highly personal topics for re-
search. Our data is from publicly available fora accessible on
the Internet without authentication. Our IRB office reviewed
the study and deemed it to not be human-subjects research,
since all data was already in the public domain. Still, we
took precautions to ensure our research remained safe and
privacy-preserving. The only identifiers we used were the pub-
lic usernames associated with each post. We did not pursue
identification of people from their posts or usernames, or col-
lect or store images. In reporting our work, we have scrubbed
information that might trace back to the people behind the
pseudonyms, e.g., locations or specific narrative details.
4 Forum Activity and Users
We begin by measuring the nature of activity on these forums.
Later on (Sections 6, 7), we use qualitative methods to more
deeply characterize their content.
Forum activity and viewership. The forums in our dataset
varied in their rates of activity and reported viewership. In
4https://docs.scrapy.org/en/latest/
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Forum A Forum B Forum C Forum D Forum E
Date of first thread Jan 2006 Aug 2005 May 2013 Oct 2008 Feb 2013
Size of forum (threads) 268 1,175 11,291 3,388 2,788
Size of forum (posts) 1,608 8,932 183,381 7,540 4,952
Unique active users in forum 462 2,102 12,740 264 543
Avg. thread views (stdev) 3,438 (13,249) 4,822 (12,194) – 1,685 (7,634) 6,315 (44,813)
Avg. thread length in posts (stdev) 7 (17) 4 (8) 16 (17) 2 (1) 2 (2)
Avg. time to new thread (stdev) 140 days (198 days) 7 days (13 days) 3 days (13 days) 1 day (11 days) 21 hrs (11 days)
Avg. time to new post (stdev) 3 days (13 days) 14 hrs (2 days) 15 minutes (2 hrs) 12 hrs (5 days) 12 hrs (2 days)
IPS-relevant % of threadsα 78 51 18 – –
Size of IPS-relevant sample (posts)α 1,411 2,011 1,032 – –
Unique users active in IPS-relevant threadsα 296 465 346 – –
% of IPS-relevant threads that escalateα 32 38 35 – –
Table 1: Comparison of the five forums in our dataset. Forum C does not provide viewership information (marked by dashes).
α Calculated via qualitative analysis of random samples of 250 threads per non-spam forum, see Section 5.
total, the forums contain 18,937 threads, with Forum C con-
taining the most threads and posts (Table 1).
Activity data in terms of thread and post times was avail-
able for all forums. We note that activity on Forums A and B
peaked between 2010 and 2015, and has significantly dropped
off in the last five years, while activity on Forum C has ex-
ploded in that time (Figure 1). We hypothesize this may repre-
sent a shift away from niche forums focused on infidelity and
towards niche subcommunities of larger social media plat-
forms like Reddit. Despite the recent drop-offs, these forums
remain publicly available resources for would-be abusers, and
contain IPS tools and tactics that are still relevant today; thus
we included them in our qualitative analysis (Section 5).
While these three forums exhibit similar seasonal and di-
urnal patterns, temporal patterns for Forums E and D exhibit
greater variability, as well as strong peaks in year-over-year
posting activity in 2013 and 2014, respectively. As we will
discuss subsequently, this reflects concentrated activity by
advertisers posting spam marketing spyware products.
Across all forums, the total number of views was approxi-
mately 30 M. This is likely a significant underestimate of total
viewership given that it does not include Reddit’s Forum C,
for which we do not have viewership data. Within each fo-
rum, the distribution of views per thread was dominated by
one or two highly viewed threads (usually ‘sticky’ threads
compiling forum rules or shared resources) and then a long
tail of less-viewed threads. The distributions of thread lengths
for each forum followed similar long-tail patterns, with an
average thread length of six posts.
Forum users and “superusers”. Table 1 shows the number
of users in each forum, identified by comparing the usernames
attached to each post via case-insensitive string equality. Fo-
rums differed in the number of unique users, from 264 in
Forum D to 12,740 in Forum C, but all forums have “supe-
rusers” that account for a disproportionate number of posts.
Figure 2 gives (left chart) a CDF of the fraction of each fo-
rum’s posts made by users and (right chart) a histogram of
the fractions of all threads to which a user posted. For clarity,
we only show the 50 and 25 most prolific users, respectively.
Forums E and D are clear outliers compared to the other
forums; this is due to spammers, as we discuss below. While
the other three forums also have superusers, they do not dom-
inate their forums to the same degree. Additionally, cursory
examination shows they are not spammers. Some are human
and robot moderators, including an automatic moderator on
Forum C that posts the subreddit’s rules as the first response
to each thread-starting post. But most superusers appear to be
humans particularly engaged in the forum, driving the culture
and activity of the community with their posts.
We additionally checked whether posters were active in
multiple forums in our data. Comparing usernames via case-
insensitive string equality, we found just eight users recurring
across forums that had no structural reason to be connected.
Of these, only one user made contributions that exceeded 1%
of posts or threads in any forum. While this finding seems
to indicate superusers are not cross-posting across multiple
forums, we note it is simple to register accounts with different
usernames in these forums. We consider the identification of
users across forums to be an area of future work.
Spyware spam and SEO inflation in Forums D and E. As
mentioned above, Forums D and E stood out along many di-
mensions. Most content in these two forums can be attributed
to a handful of users: notably, the top user in Forum D con-
tributed to 95% of threads and authored 45% of posts, and the
second-most-active user contributed to 95% of threads and
authored 44% of posts. Forum E exhibits a similar pattern of
dominance by a handful of users.
Inspection shows many of the threads in Forum D constitute
conversations between its top two users: one posts a spam
advertisement for a spyware tool, and another follows up with
a short response. We conclude this demonstrates a strategy of
search engine optimization (SEO) employed by the company
behind the spyware tool to boost the forum’s visibility on
Internet searches and attract attention to their spyware product.
Specifically, 94% of the posts made by the top user were
the same message: an advertisement for the spyware tool.
This user also authored nearly half (45%) of the posts on this
forum. Forum D’s second-most-prolific user bears a username
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Figure 1: Histograms (normalized to maximum bin value in forum) for (left) postings per year, with shading indicating the years
for which we have post data for the forum, (middle) postings per month of year, and (right) postings per hour of day.
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Figure 2: (Left) Cumulative fraction of posts per user for the top 50 users. (Middle) Fraction of threads with posts from the top
25 users. Forum E (resp. Forum D) are dominated by 1 (resp. 2) superusers, while the other three forums show a more even
spread of posts and threads among users. (Right) Multiple-forum users and the forums in which they posted. Excludes the 17
users found posting in Forums D and E, which share a parent forum.
closely associated with that spyware tool, and posts either ads
for the tool or short, meaningless messages (“Hi,” “Hello”)
in response to the first user’s ads. We found similar patterns
within Forum E. Having concluded that most activity on these
two forums was spam intended to inflate SEO for specific
spyware products, we excluded them from our qualitative
analysis of forum content (Sections 6, 7).
Prevalence of IPS-related keywords. To efficiently under-
stand the organic content in the three infidelity forums, we
sought automated ways to identify only those threads that
were relevant to IPS. As a first-cut assessment, we performed
keyword-based searches of the threads in our dataset using a
small set of keywords identified from prior work [6]: “spy”,
“monitor”, “track”, “hack” and “record” (Table 2).
This first-cut assessment showed keyword searches are,
unsurprisingly, insufficient for accurate discovery of relevant
threads: for example, the keyword ‘record’ may be used in
the context of recording someone without their consent, but
also in the context of music recordings. To quantify this, we
assembled a human-labeled dataset of 750 threads sampled
across each of the three non-spam forums and manually coded
for relevance to IPS (see Section 5 for detailed methods).
We then applied a regex-based labeling method that flagged
threads as relevant if any post within the thread contained any
one of keywords in our seed set. Using our 750 human-labeled
threads as ground truth, this simple approach achieves an AUC
of 0.62, indicating it misses a large number of relevant threads
(false negatives) and contains a large number of irrelevant
threads (false positives).
As a result, we do not rely on the regex-based approach
for any of our subsequent analyses, but instead study the
posts human-labeled as ground truth. The development of
automated learning techniques that can efficiently flag IPS-
relevant threads remains a tantalizing area of future work.
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Keywords A B C D E
spy 26.9 7.1 1.6 98.4 42.1
monitor 8.6 2.2 3.0 97.8 27.8
track 13.4 5.4 8.8 25.7 30.0
hack 3.7 1.1 2.3 1.1 4.1
record 14.9 7.8 7.3 3.8 1.4
spy, monitor, track, hack, record 43.7 17.3 17.6 99.4 62.3
Table 2: Percentage of threads within each forum containing
one or more of the indicated keywords.
5 Understanding Forum Content
Our data contain rich information on attackers’ strategies, in-
teractions, and stated goals embedded in the natural language
of users’ posts. Here, we describe our qualitative methods for
analyzing the content within Forums A, B & C.
Establishing human ratings for IPS relevance. Our initial
measurements showed not all content on these forums is rele-
vant to the discussion of IPS tactics: for example, while 8 of
the top 10 threads by viewership on Forum B contained some
mention of ways to monitor an intimate partner, the other
two threads discussed contraception and women’s underwear.
Thus, to focus our analysis, we first established human ratings
for whether or not a given thread was relevant to IPS.
We began by randomly choosing 30 threads, 10 from each
forum. Three coders independently rated whether each thread
was IPS-relevant. We stipulated that a relevant thread should
both (1) discuss an intent to track, monitor, surveil, or other-
wise compromise an intimate partner’s privacy; and (2) de-
scribe doing so via technology. Inter-rater reliability showed
agreement in 28/30 threads (Fleiss’ kappa of 0.91 [34]).
We then expanded our analysis to arrive at a set of IPS-
relevant threads for further study. We randomly sampled 750
threads (250 from each forum) that we split evenly among the
three coders. As reported in Table 1, we ultimately found 78%
of the sampled data within Forum A was relevant to IPS; 51%
within Forum B; and 18% within Forum C. These figures
are in line with expectations: Forum A, which is explicitly
dedicated to “investigative equipment”, has the highest preva-
lence of IPS-related content, while Forum C, which has a
more general focus on discussion of infidelity, has the lowest.
In total, 370 of the 750 randomly sampled threads were
coded as IPS-relevant. We found no statistically significant
correlations between thread viewership and IPS relevance in
any forum, or any noteworthy patterns in seasonal, diurnal, or
year-over-year posting activity within IPS-relevant data.
Understanding IPS-relevant content. We used open the-
matic coding [4] to make sense of the 370 IPS-relevant threads.
Three researchers independently read through several threads
and generated initial codes. We then met over multiple ses-
sions to jointly develop a codebook. Through multiple rounds
of iteration, we refined the codebook by applying it to addi-
tional data until we reached saturation and codebook stability.
Our final codebook contained 29 codes clustered into two
high-level categories: forum culture and tools and tactics
(see Appendix A). Once the codebook was finalized, three
researchers divided up the remaining threads and coded them.
Our research team stayed in close correspondence throughout
the analysis, repeatedly meeting to discuss threads that were
unclear at first pass. We also took steps to minimize the impact
of repeated readings of detailed stories of IPS and violence on
our team. Researchers were encouraged to take breaks where
needed, to reach out to each other regularly to process what
we were reading, and to practice self-care.
We report the themes that emerged from our analysis in Sec-
tions 6 and 7. We emphasize that our analyses are qualitative:
thus, we do not report raw or percentage prevalence numbers
for any of our themes, except where noted and appropriately
tested via inter-rater reliability measurements.
6 Forum Interactions
In this section, we give a general overview of how users inter-
act within these forums. We begin by discussing how users
self-report finding these communities, and what they seek
within them. We then describe how communities respond to
their requests. We identify threads in which communities en-
courage users to conduct IPS, either by encouraging them to
carry out existing attacks, or by providing them with ideas for
attacks of increased severity—what we call escalation. We
also identify threads in which communities discourage users
from IPS at all, a pattern we call de-escalation.
How users find these forums. In several threads in each
forum, users describe how and why they sought out these fo-
rums in the first place. Many described locating the forum via
basic Google queries on topics related to infidelity and cheat-
ing. In other posts, users reported discovering the site through
a trusted recommendation from a professional enlisted to help
them with their relationships, such as a therapist.
Our data also show that for Forums A and B, users are often
directed to these specific forums by moderators or users of
other communities within their parent forum. For example, a
moderator in Forum A posted in response to a thread starter:
“I asked you to come here to click on the many threads
and read information for yourself. There are pages and
pages all about spying . . . This forum is a kind of archive
where the information will be available for anyone to
peruse at leisure. There is no need to wait. Look around!”
Here, we see a forum moderator reinforce that these discus-
sions are a resource for anyone to browse. We discovered that
Forum A in particular hosts several ‘resource threads’ pinned
at the top of the forum that provide primers for beginners.
Forum-goers’ stated goals. Once in the forum, most users
make an initial post outlining a complex social situation,
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usually suspected or actualized infidelity, and ask the commu-
nity for advice on what to do, e.g. “How can I forgive him?” or
“How do I move on?” Most of these posts sought suggestions
from others for ‘next steps’, such as confronting their intimate
partner or seeking legal advice. The bulk of posts within Fo-
rum C followed this pattern, mimicking the advice-seeking
observed broadly in forums for social support [9, 20, 47].
We also identified a different kind of request focused on
technical support for intended or ongoing IPS, e.g. “How
can I read my wife’s Facebook messages?” or “How do I use
this spyware tool?” Many of these users contextualized their
asks in a detailed narrative of their situation that included an
admission of past IPS, most commonly by reading a partner’s
text messages or emails. For example, consider this initial
post, paraphrased from Forum B:
“I caught my wife by reading her journal and emails. She
does not know that I know, and I continue to monitor her
email account. I don’t think she knows. I haven’t told a
soul about this, so this is my release. I can elaborate...”
Not all users framed their interactions as requests, however;
a subset of thread starters within Forums A and B posted to
share unsolicited advice on working with certain IPS tools.
This advice was often couched in a personal narrative (e.g.
“Here’s how I tracked his Internet history after he deleted it”)
and usually promoted the use of the tools. We consider these
to be organic advertisements for these tools, the implications
of which are discussed in Section 8.
Overall, we identified three high-level goals for users who
sought IPS-related advice across these forums. Many users
fixated on reading their partner’s emails or text messages, or
what we call (1) investigation of a partner’s prior activities.
Many were also interested in real-time access to their part-
ner’s devices, to gain information such as live updates on their
partner’s location and browsing history: in our view, these
attackers sought (2) continuous monitoring of a partner’s cur-
rent and future device use. Finally, we saw that many posters
expanded the target of their IPS to include a suspected affair
partner, with the goal of identifying their personal information
(e.g., name, address or vehicle registration). We use the term
affair partner here to mean the person involved in an affair
outside of the intimate relationship, occasionally referred to
as the ‘other’ man or woman, and we name this goal as a (3)
compromise of a suspected affair partner’s privacy.
Community escalations. Communities’ responses to users’
requests varied. As expected for online support forums, many
responded with emotional support and advice on manag-
ing infidelity, including recommendations for looking after
users’ mental and physical health. In a significant body of
threads, however, communities responded by encouraging
thread starters to pursue their current enactment of IPS, or
even to increase the severity of their attacks. We call this a
pattern of escalation: a situation in which a user begins with
a relatively benign request for information, and through in-
teractions with one or more IPS promoters is presented with
ideas for enacting or increasing the severity of an IPS attack.
Consider this example from Forum B. A user begins a
thread by asking for emotional support: “I can’t believe my
relationship has come to this, but I need some advice. Recently
I discovered a situation that I’m not sure how to perceive...”
An hour later, a responder offers several actionable ways for
the user to invade their partner’s privacy:
“There are several things you can do. Start by going into
full snoop mode. Purchase a voice activated recorder and
put it in his car. Snoop his phone records. Place spyware
on his computer. Snoop his emails and FB account.”
From there, a concerning dialogue unfolds. As the thread
starter shares more details of their story over follow-up posts,
the same responder repeatedly suggests ways to enact IPS,
for example by offering:
“A voice-activated recorder is cheap, $40 at Walmart.
Stop bringing this up, and make him think everything is
back to normal. Then, monitor him. Good luck.”
To get a sense of the prevalence of this thread pattern in
our corpus, we conducted an additional qualitative coding
effort over our human-labeled sampling of IPS-relevant posts.
Three coders first coded a random set of 30 relevant threads
(10 from each forum) for whether or not they showed a pat-
tern of escalation. Inter-rater reliability showed substantial
agreement between raters: out of the 30 posts, all 3 raters
agreed on 25 posts, and the remaining 5 showed 2 out of 3
raters in agreement (Fleiss’s kappa of 0.77). We then split the
remaining relevant threads among the three coders, finding
that approximately one-third of relevant threads showed pat-
terns of escalation (Table 1). This proportion remained the
same in both forums explicitly focused on investigating sus-
pected deception (A, B), and in more general support forums
for those ‘recovering’ from infidelity (C).
Community de-escalations. While escalations appeared
with alarming prevalence in our dataset, we also found a
handful of instances of the opposite: de-escalations, in which
the community deterred a user from conducting IPS.
In many of these cases, responders reminded posters of the
physical and mental impact of continuously performing IPS
on a partner. These responders saw that IPS directly under-
mined the trust required for recovery of a healthy intimate
relationship. As this example from Forum A shows:
“You’ve got to ask though, when do you stop snooping?
That can’t be healthy for your relationship if you’re being
insecure about everything.”
De-escalating responders also often pointed out that IPS
may not help people achieve their goals, and instead sabo-
tage a relationship. For cases where IPS had already been
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Tool-based attacks that require physical access
Using a cellphone backup recovery tool on a partner’s device
Installing a keylogger on a partner’s device
Installing screen recording spyware on a partner’s device
Installing GPS trackers on a partner’s body or in their car
Installing audiovisual recorders in the car or the home
Tool-based attacks that do not require physical access
Leveraging features of a shared phone plan
Using shared cloud tools to access a partner’s personal data
Using router monitoring tools to track and manipulate Internet activity
Using reverse lookup directories to find personal information
Coercion and subterfuge
Leveraging physical proximity to gain access
Convincing a partner to give total access
Catfishing a partner
Outsourced attacks
Hiring a private investigator
Table 3: Taxonomy of IPS attacks promoted on these forums.
committed, a small number of users pointed out how the in-
timate partner may be experiencing this level of privacy in-
trusion. We demonstrate this ‘pushback’ against IPS through
this responder on Forum B, after a thread starter admits to
monitoring his partner through a home security system:
“You sound crazy to watch her like that! The fact that
you’ve analyzed every little detail on the system tells ev-
eryone a lot about your own insecurities ... come on dude,
you’re trying to make something out of nothing here.”
Some de-escalating responders also reminded thread
starters of the potential legal consequences of engaging in
IPS. This included warnings that the use of some attacks
could result in a criminal record, failed divorce proceedings
due to misbehavior, or expulsion from social groups.
7 Taxonomy of IPS Attacks
We now describe the IPS tools and tactics discussed within
these forums. We present a taxonomy (Table 3) of four types
of attacks: (1) tool-based attacks requiring physical access,
including installing spyware on a partner’s phone and attach-
ing GPS trackers to their person; (2) tool-based attacks not
requiring physical access, including leveraging shared cloud
accounts; (3) strategies involving coercion and subterfuge, for
example convincing a partner to provide access, or tricking
them into connecting with falsified social media profiles; and
(4) outsourced attacks, namely hiring private investigators.
7.1 Tools that require physical access
Our analysis surfaced many attacks requiring access to a
target’s devices. These attacks are particularly possible in
IPS, due to the proximity between intimate partners [19].
Backup recovery tools. Recall that a common goal for at-
tackers was the discovery of what a partner said in their texts
or emails. To this end, responders promoting IPS often rec-
ommended the use of cellphone backup recovery tools: both
specific software dedicated to reading data from phones or
SIM cards, and creative workarounds leveraging built-in iOS
or Android features to access that same information. Some of
the spyware previously reported [6] works by accessing simi-
lar data stores; our data show for the first time how attackers
share these products with each other, and how they homebrew
their own tools for accessing this information.
In particular, a substantial number of threads were dedi-
cated to tools that recovered deleted texts from iPhones. Sim-
ilar tools were available for Android phones, and in older
threads we even surfaced evidence of responders helping
attackers retrieve texts from Blackberries. While some re-
sponders in these threads advocated for the use of specific
products, others presented instructions for homebrewed tools
they had developed to read messages from a partner’s backup
files synced to shared iTunes or iCloud storage. Some respon-
ders posted code anyone could use to convert such backup
files into text files for easy reading, and many also offered
one-on-one technical support.
Keyloggers and screen recorders. Many attackers were in-
terested in continuous capture of their partners’ digital activ-
ities, such as websites they visited or passwords they used.
For these attackers, responders often recommended installing
keyloggers and screen recorders on a partner’s devices. These
tools had been surfaced as potential spyware in prior work [6],
but our data highlight they are actively shared as solutions
for attackers on these forums. One responder on Forum C
claimed he had installed keyloggers on all PCs and laptops in
his home, describing the benefits of these tools:
“Great for capturing passwords & her true thoughts when
messaging (things she backspaced over and didn’t send).”
Many responders also recommended screen recorders, such as
those built for companies to install on workers’ devices—in
fact, this use case was often invoked to prove a product’s legit-
imacy. Responders also discussed the benefits and drawbacks
of specific products, including whether the paid tiers of some
tools were worth purchasing.
Location tracking and audiovisual recording. We saw
many instances of responders recommending tools for en-
vironmental surveillance of a partner’s activities, conversa-
tions and whereabouts, e.g., voice-activated recorders and
GPS tracking devices placed in key locations like a partner’s
car. Responders were quick to make recommendations about
where to obtain these devices, how much one should expect to
pay for them, and best practices for hiding them from targets:
“A GPS tracker can fit into a purse without them knowing.
I’m positive you can figure out a place to stash one in a
car. People track autistic kids and animals with them.”
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Surveillance of partners in cars was a recurring theme
throughout our data. In addition to providing recommenda-
tions on the best places in a car to place a GPS tracker, several
threads promoted the use of more sophisticated tools that plug
into a car’s on-board diagnostics (OBD) system and continu-
ously report the car’s location to a remote database, to which
an attacker can then subscribe. These tools would be useful,
one responder said, because “unless a person knows to check
the OBD they would never think to look for it.”
7.2 Tools that do not require physical access
For would-be attackers who were unable to access a partner’s
phone to install spyware or car to plant a GPS tracker, the
responders in our data readily provided tools that did not
require physical access to partner or device.
Leveraging shared phone plans. Many would-be attackers
sought ways to leverage the fact that they shared a phone
plan with their intended target. Most seemed to know that a
partner’s call and SMS histories were accessible on a phone
bill; in fact, viewing these was often the first thing an attacker
tried, and the use of these records as vectors for abuse has
been documented [19]. But the contents of messages are often
left off of phone bills; in response, our data show these at-
tackers come to the forums to find other ways to obtain more
information from their service providers.
Responders regularly provided tips on how to contact ser-
vice providers and obtain more detailed records: for example,
in one thread on Forum B, a responder described how to con-
tact Verizon and set up a monthly spreadsheet dump of all
call activity. Phone companies were required to provide these
records to account owners, the responder claimed, as a form
of consumer protection.
Attackers were also savvy to the many other ways a
provider’s plan management tools could be used to surveil
a partner. Verizon, AT&T, and T-Mobile were purported to
have capabilities ranging from email monitoring to mobile
keylogging. Consider the following exchange on Forum A:
Attacker: “We are in the process of choosing new cell-
phones and a new company. Which is the best company
to keep tabs, records, etc? We currently have iPhones on
AT&T, and their Family Map did help me prove his affair.”
Responder: “If you’re getting everything you need with
AT&T, I would stay with them. They have immediate online
access [to phone records] and their GPS is good.”
In this example, we see responders outline the features of
shared plans that make them useful to an attacker: immediate
online access to call and text histories, quality GPS for loca-
tion tracking, and family sharing products that provide easy-
to-use interfaces for surveillant capabilities. This last type
of tool was especially common in our data, confirming prior
work [6, 19]. This example also highlights the collaborative
nature of how attacks surface in these forums, with a respon-
der echoing and encouraging an attacker towards IPS. Of
note, the responder in this example is the third-most-prolific
superuser of Forum A, and many of their posts are similarly
IPS-related.
Features of shared cloud services. Many tools that did not
require physical device access took advantage of the built-in
features of cloud-based sharing tools. The use of cloud tools
for abuse has been reported in prior work [19]; however, our
data show for the first time how attackers share these tools
with each other as ways to overcome targets’ defenses.
In many threads, attackers seemed aware of the ways
iCloud tools in particular could be used to surveil partners
who had not provided device access. One thread began:
“What is the best spyware if I can’t get their phone, but
have their Apple ID and password?”
In this example and many others, our data show attackers
are encouraged by the forum to use their partner’s Apple ID to
view their personal messages and photos from a web browser—
no device access necessary. This was commonly invoked as a
solution for attackers who sought more detailed information
on their partner’s texts than records from a service provider
contained. Many of these attackers reported they arrived at
this method of attack because they had seen a drop-off in their
partner’s texting activity as reported by their phone bills, and
had inferred the partner had moved to iMessage or another
messaging service that used data rather than SMS. (Messaging
that uses data is not typically itemized on a phone bill.)
Some of these attacks, however, did not even require an
attacker to use a partner’s login, because their personal data
was already syncing to a shared Apple device. For example, an
attacker on Forum C described discovering she could view a
partner’s messages on a family iPad, which was synced to her
partner’s iCloud account. Our data show attacks of this nature
also levied against third-parties, namely the affair partners: in
one thread on Forum B, an attacker describes realizing her
partner’s affair partner was using an iPad synced to an iCloud
account shared by all three-parties, making her purchasing
and Internet history accessible for the attacker to browse.
Attackers were particularly eager to share how iCloud tools
could be used for location tracking. One attacker on Forum A
described how to use the Significant Locations feature within
iOS to examine a partner’s recent location history. In an-
other thread on Forum A, a user shared an article on Find My
Friends and called out its abusive potential:
“Interesting article about an iPhone app called ‘Find My
Friends’, which you may be able to load on your spouse’s
phone to track their whereabouts.”
Cloud-based tools outside of the Apple ecosystem were
also called out for similar purposes. One responder on Fo-
rum C shared how Android users could view a “timeline” of
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a partner’s visited locations via their Google Maps account.
Another shared how WhatsApp’s phone-to-Web syncing fea-
tures could be used in concert with one-time physical access
to maintain continuous access to a partner’s messages. This
responder described the initial connection as a “one-minute
job” best done while a partner sleeps, and claimed they were
“actually shocked at what a privacy flaw this seems to be.”
Lastly, our forums contained many suggestions for mobile
spyware products that leveraged cloud-based access to a tar-
get’s device, such as tools marketed for use in parental control
contexts. Much of the discussion of these products also of-
fered advice on free versus paid tiers, setup and configuration,
and even best practices for contacting customer service teams.
Web traffic trackers on shared networks. In several fo-
rums, we discovered threads in which responders offered ad-
vice on how to install web traffic monitoring tools on a shared
WiFi network. The scope of this attack and the level of detail
in which it was described was noticeably more sophisticated
than others in our data, or what has to our knowledge been
previously reported.
In one thread on Forum C, a person who described them-
selves as a “heartbroken techie” with a background in soft-
ware development started a thread detailing how they used a
DNS resolution service to monitor the traffic on their home
router. With their tool, the attacker said, they could record
every website their partner visited, regardless of whether they
deleted their Internet history, in the form of reports issued
within 24 hours. The attacker shared the command line scripts
and configurations they had used, and even offered to share
a GitHub repository where others could retrieve their code.
In addition to describing how they used the service to mon-
itor router traffic, they went on to discuss how they used its
domain blocking alerts to manipulate their partner:
“You can set up a customized message (as I call it, the ‘oh
shit’ alert) that will pop up if they try accessing a site that
is blocked. It’s amazing how much someone will confess
if they know you’re tech-savvy and you tell them you have
a detailed history of their actions (even if you don’t.)”
In another case, a responder on Forum A who claimed to
be a computer security professional introduced the forum to
the concept of a man-in-the-middle attack and recommended
an entry-level tool for mounting one. As they described, the
tool was able to obtain not just a history of websites visited,
but also copies of data sent over the network, e.g. the contents
of emails and chats. Most notably, they described the tool as
a way to actively manipulate a partner’s activity:
“[You can also] modify the data traffic in real time. This
can be used for tactics like replacing phone numbers,
names and addresses as they travel over the network.
Think about creative ways to change the contents of the
websites/emails/chats that they’re looking at.”
This last example was sourced from one of the ‘resource
threads’ in Forum A. The responder goes on to offer his
services to community members who want help mounting
such attacks. We discuss the implications of these types of
attacks and the role of technologists providing such support
in Section 8.
Reverse lookup directories. Lastly, our data show would-
be attackers seeking and receiving tips for investigating their
partners’ prior actions via reverse lookup tools, used most
commonly to identify people from their phone numbers. Most
cases presented as a thread starter finding an unknown number
in a partner’s texts or call records via other attacks, and then
asking the forum for advice on how to discover whether it
belonged to an affair partner or an escort service:
“If anyone knows a really good reverse cell lookup, please
let me know. Just found a few unknown numbers on my
husband’s phone.”
Many solutions offered were simple websites containing
databases of people’s personal information—one thread even
offered tips on how to search Facebook by phone number.
But responders in our data also recommended a wide array of
commercial products that market themselves as collators of
public information on individuals (e.g., WhitePages). Many
of these tools offer a free tier enabling lookup of names, ad-
dresses, and phone numbers in addition to a paid service for
more thorough background checks. Although these tools are
relatively unsophisticated from a technical perspective, they
featured in several stories that resulted in an attacker con-
fronting their partner or suspected affair partner at an address
or phone number located through these services.
7.3 Coercion and subterfuge
In addition to recommending specific tools, many responders
had advice for coercing or subverting a target into providing
access to their data and accounts, most often passwords.
Leveraging physical proximity to gain access. Attackers
frequently shared how they used their close physical proximity
to their targets to overcome common defenses without specific
tooling. While many of these tactics had been previously
reported from victims’ perspectives [19], we report for the
first time attackers jointly developing such coercive strategies
in public forums.
In many cases, attackers advised each other to manipulate
a partner into ‘accidentally’ revealing a password, as seen in
the following example from Forum A:
“Get her to send texts . . . while you are sitting next to her.
Then try to make out the password as she types it in.”
These strategies often did not require active manipulation.
In some cases, gaining access was as simple as waiting for a
partner to fall asleep:
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“My wife would get drunk and pass out. It was simple to
just hold the iPhone up to her thumb to unlock it. Took
pictures of a lot of conversations so I have a record.”
Some would-be attackers sought help creating opportuni-
ties like these. In one thread on Forum A, an attacker asks:
“I have wondered if there is a relaxing drug that will knock
her out long enough for me to scan her texts and photos.
Any suggestions on how I get that phone?”
Once a partner slept or was otherwise unconscious, attack-
ers and responders offered a range of strategies for exploiting
their lowered defenses. These included ways to overcome two-
factor authentication schemes—namely, resetting passwords
on locked accounts and taking the opportunity to capture
codes—as well as ways to plant monitoring tools that could
track activity long-term, such as swapping their SIM card into
a partner’s device to capture their call and text activity.
Creating fake profiles to access their social media. Coer-
cive attacks did not necessarily need to be physical or direct:
we also found evidence of manipulations via social media.
Several threads showed attacks using fake social media pro-
files to overcome the privacy controls a target may have set.
While the use of fake social media profiles to directly harass
targets has been reported [19], we found evidence of attack-
ers leveraging fake profiles in a new way: using second- and
third-degree connections to access a target’s profile.
In one thread on Forum A, a responder details step-by-step
how to fabricate a believable Facebook account, and use it to
befriend accounts that are friends with the target. The attacker
can thus access parts of the target’s social media profiles that
have been locked away from the attacker, but have remained
unlocked to what they believe are friends-of-friends. The
responder describes the access afforded thus:
“After your friend request has been accepted, revisit the
pages where you couldn’t see anything before. You’ll be
shocked at how much information will suddenly be avail-
able, as many MANY people set up security so it’s not
public, but can be viewed by friends-of-friends. In my
neck of the woods there are a lot of local bars that have
1000+ friends and guess what? Every one of those 1000+
friends has now given access to those 1000+ people that
allow friends-of-friends to see their info, and I’d guess
over half do.”
That responder then cautions attackers to ensure the privacy
settings on their real and fake Facebook profiles are set to
only show information to the account owner, because, the
responder says, “I don’t believe FB is secure.”
Convincing a partner to provide total access. Our data
also showed attackers and responders championing a strat-
egy of simply convincing a partner that unfettered access to
all devices and accounts should be expected in an intimate
partnership. In our context, infidelity forums, this was often
raised as a way to facilitate reconciliation after an affair:
“Tell her you need her iCloud password to review some-
thing. If she refuses, that’s a giant red flag. Then I suggest
you say ‘wife, I love you dearly, but if I don’t see what’s on
that phone, then you are telling me that you’re cheating.
If you have nothing to hide, then let me see it.’ ”
Freed et al. [19] previously reported that abusers often
convinced IPV survivors to share their passwords during
“good” phases of a relationship as a way to establish trust,
and subsequently threatened them to continue sharing or face
consequences when the relationship turned “bad”. Our work
extends this to show that attackers promote to each other
the idea of privacy compromise as currency in abusive re-
lationships, often describing this as key to overcoming the
emotional toll of suspicions of infidelity. In fact, many of
these threads shared stories in which a partner who was sus-
pected of cheating in the past still shared total access months
or years later.
7.4 Outsourced attacks
The final category of IPS attacks surfaced in our data are
those in which a responder recommends external resources
for investigation or monitoring of an intimate partner.
Private investigators (PIs). As expected for an infidelity
forum context, many attackers and responders within our data
referenced hiring PIs to track their partners, with the goal of
finding evidence of an affair. Notably, hiring a PI was framed
as a legal and ethical way to obtain information, as in this
example from a responder on Forum B:
“You should hire a PI, who acts within the law to obtain
the confirmation you require. But that’s all that it will be
in the vast majority of cases...merely confirmation.”
Many of the PIs recommended in our data offered services
within their specific localities, e.g., “He does not do surveil-
lance unless the target originates in [specific U.S. state].”
These recommendations typically included a phone number
to call and a person to ask for—or even, in some cases, a
person from the forum to claim as a referral. In addition
to general recommendations to seek out PIs and referrals to
specific PIs, we also found one thread in which a responder
posted a link to the website of a specific national agency, as
well as another thread with a directory of ‘vetted’ PIs. These
recommendations were often framed as more costly than other
attacks, to be used as a last resort. One responder on Forum A
remarked PIs were expensive, but at least “cheaper than a
divorce lawyer”.
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8 Discussion
We now synthesize takeaways from our findings for anti-IPS
efforts. First, our work extends the IPS threat model outlined
in this and prior works [6,19]. Security experts seeking to pre-
vent their work from misuse in IPS might consider account-
ing for this threat model in their technology development
practices—in particular, Freed et al. [19] supplies the concept
of a UI-bound adversary as a consideration for design teams.
We additionally outline broader considerations for security
experts, including the use of these online communities as
a source of IPS threat intelligence and the development of
countermeasures that target the commercial entities behind
the spyware industry. Finally, we describe how our work is
already impacting interventions, and close by posing a set of
open ethical questions for the security community.
Online forums are a rich source of IPS threat intelligence.
Our work highlights how analysis of online communities
can provide anti-IPS advocates with valuable intelligence
on the motivations and tactics of intimate partner abusers.
By observing how attackers interact in these forums and the
specific tools they promote for use, we were able to surface
new knowledge on IPS strategies that can directly inform
interventional efforts.
Our results confirm findings from prior work that showed
the abundance of dual-use and overt spyware apps available
for attackers [6], and highlighting victims’ experiences of
tech-enabled abuse [19]. But the details of how, precisely,
abusers learn to mount these attacks had not previously been
reported, and attackers’ levels of sophistication had not been
well-understood. Our analysis highlights how attackers are
collaborating on new tactics in these forums, and surfaces
how these attacks are conducted at an unprecedented level
of granularity. For example, we find that attackers are not
just inspecting targets’ call histories on shared family plans,
as has been reported previously [19]—they are also sharing
strategies on how best to contact service providers and obtain
more detailed records. We also surface novel attacks more
sophisticated than those previously reported in the IPS con-
text, for example the use of WiFi router tools to monitor and
manipulate a partner.
Mining these forums for threat intelligence might help anti-
IPS efforts stay ahead of attackers’ ever-evolving techniques.
We see substantial future work in creating semi-automated
tools that enable analyses like ours to scale. As our initial key-
word searches (Section 4) showed, the way IPS manifests in
user-generated natural language may be too nuanced for cur-
rent automated techniques alone to reliably detect. However,
human ratings are laborious and inefficient and, importantly,
repeated exposure to stories of abuse can inflict harm on peo-
ple analyzing large bodies of such texts [15]. These problems
are exacerbated on large social media platforms, where the
volume and speed of conversations generated by millions of
users creates urgent problems of scale.
We see a role for advanced language processing techniques
in overcoming these challenges. For example, a system might
quickly and reliably extract the specific strategies recom-
mended within a post without relying on forum-specific fea-
tures (as applied in cybercrime marketplaces in [14]). Such
a system might provide a valuable pipeline for security and
privacy researchers and anti-IPV advocates building frontline
defenses against emergent attack strategies, for example the
Coalition Against Stalkerware.5
In fact, our work has already had impact in this regard. We
shared our results with the team of practitioners that runs a
technology clinic providing direct interventions to IPV sur-
vivors facing IPS [17, 22].6 At time of writing, they are work-
ing to integrate our threat intelligence into their training ma-
terials for advocates, as well as their clinic’s procedures for
discovering and mitigating how abusers are enacting surveil-
lance against their clients.
The for-profit industry behind IPS products uses online
forums to market their tools. Our work also shows that the
online ecosystems promoting spyware feature a significant
presence from companies creating and marketing their own
surveillance products. At one extreme, we found entire forums
bloated with spam advertisements for a single spyware tool,
suggesting these forums were leveraged to manipulate that
tool’s SEO. We also found that recommendations for IPS tools
are not just manifesting as spam advertisements and SEO for
specific spyware apps, but are also shared organically among
users in the forum communities.
Within these organic posts, responders engage meaning-
fully with forum-goers’ relationship problems, but also evan-
gelize specific IPS tools or approaches and even serve as
technical support for users’ spyware installations. Their posts
reveal the concerns of consumers in this market: we find posts
on the merits and drawbacks of a range of spyware products,
both free and paid, and the market rates for voice-activated
recorders, GPS trackers, and PIs. All told, our analysis sug-
gests these forums are likely one corner of a broad industry
offering ‘solutions’ for would-be attackers to turn suspicions
of infidelity into actualized IPS.
These findings suggest a role for mitigation strategies
that directly target these commercial entities. Prior work
has demonstrated ways to undermine commercially moti-
vated spam and SEO attacks by working directly with banks
and payment processors to make e-crime difficult to mon-
etize [26, 33]. Similar approaches may be effective in the
context of IPS. Future work should investigate further the
mechanics of how forums like these are leveraged as market-
ing tactics by spyware companies, with the goal of informing
such ‘follow-the-money’ countermeasures. Similar counter-
measures might be also useful for security experts concerned
about keeping their tools from being misused for IPS: it is
5https://stopstalkerware.org
6https://www.ipvtechresearch.org/
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possible, for example, that dual-use apps [6] are being ad-
vertised as spyware. Where possible, security experts should
prevent their tools from being marketed in this way.
Platform-level defenses might mitigate the spread of IPS.
In addition, our work raises concerns for large social media
platforms, where conversations escalating into IPS “how-tos”
may be happening in spaces that are not specifically dedicated
to infidelity, surveillance, or intimate relationships.
We have highlighted features of IPS-relevant conversations,
and outlined an agenda for creating semi-automated tech-
niques to extract attackers’ strategies from such forums. Plat-
forms concerned about their role in enabling the spread of IPS
could use this work to develop community norms or content
moderation strategies attuned to these forums’ dynamics—for
example, the moderators of Forum C might consider banning
posts that escalate threads into IPS, and instead seek to en-
courage de-escalation. Future work might investigate further
the scale of the problem within popular social media networks
as a first step to developing such mitigation strategies.
Social media platforms might also consider the fake profile
attacks discussed in Section 7.3, and use the patterns we un-
covered to more effectively surface falsified accounts. They
might also consider de-emphasizing second- and third-degree
network connections in users’ experiences of their platforms,
or offer privacy controls that limit users’ audiences to first-
degree connections by default.
Online communities are collaboratively creating new IPS
attacks. Our work also shows that people with significant
training in computer security and privacy, while potentially
well-meaning, are actually helping to further develop IPS
attacks on these forums.
We were surprised to see the level of technical sophistica-
tion in some threads, particularly in contrast to the relatively
unsophisticated techniques reported in prior studies with vic-
tims [19, 32]. Some attacks did fall into the bucket of previ-
ously known techniques, for example physical privacy viola-
tions like shoulder surfing that are addressable through exist-
ing defense strategies [10, 28]. However, several involved the
use of custom shell scripts and other more sophisticated tech-
niques, including methods for extracting information from
artifacts like iPhone backups and leveraging DNS resolution
tools to manipulate a partner’s Internet traffic.
In a sense, the IPS promoters who championed their home-
grown surveillance tools in these forums were engaged in a
process of collaborative innovation, working with other tech-
savvy community members to create and refine new abuse
tactics. This is similar to behaviors seen previously in cyber-
crime forums [44], in which a handful of sophisticated users
create tools and then provide or sell them to the community.
These collaborative processes are not just creating more ef-
ficient attacks, they are also making attacks more accessible
to more would-be attackers: much of the discussion on these
forums serves as how-to guides for less tech-savvy members,
and in many cases communities even provide one-on-one
troubleshooting. Future research might further analyze the co-
operative dynamics of how these forums develop new attacks,
and compare these against known tactics used to perpetrate
harm in offline settings (c.f., [23]).
Infidelity is used as a justification for IPS. The forums we
studied were rife with emotionally vulnerable people seeking
and receiving assistance with difficult interpersonal problems.
But they were also rife with attackers freely admitting to and
promoting the use of surveillance tools against an intimate
partner, often by arguing that infidelity justifies surveillance.
In this, we see that the context of infidelity both attracted peo-
ple to the forums as a site for emotional support and masked
them from the social exclusion they might have faced if admit-
ting to IPS in a non-infidelity context [23]. This is particularly
concerning for anti-IPS efforts, as it can set a precedent of
using infidelity as an excuse for abusive actions—a practice
mirrored in offline discussions with abusers in IPV [36].
We see compelling areas for future work in using these
forums to identify the cultural norms and justifications that
encourage abusive behaviors. In concert with ongoing behav-
ior change work with abusers [27], such work could draw on
the patterns of de-escalation we uncovered to develop alterna-
tive strategies for resolving suspicions of infidelity without
resorting to IPS. These alternatives could be promoted be-
fore IPS on these forums, thereby retaining the supportive
community structure they provide to some forum-goers while
discouraging abusive practices.
The infidelity forum setting also creates gray areas for
the computer security community at large. Some of the re-
sponders providing (ab)users with strategies for IPS were
self-described computer security experts who reported using
the same tools they promoted for surveillance in their profes-
sional work. In the context of helping people who reported
they were in toxic relationships, these experts may have felt
their material support facilitating IPS was justified. What’s
more, in the context of publicly available forums like the
ones in our study, these experts’ bespoke surveillance solu-
tions constitute a persistent record accessible to anyone on
the Internet with little effort. It is possible that well-meaning
computer security experts may have facilitated IPS not just for
the user who posted in the forum, but also for the numerous
people who would browse these threads in the future.
We raise these tensions as a set of open ethical questions for
the security community. Much as medical doctors operate by
a professional code of conduct to ‘do no harm,’ should com-
puter security experts abide by a corresponding professional
ethos to wield their expertise only for good? How should judg-
ment calls between justifiable and unjustifiable surveillance
be made, and who should make them? And how can computer
security experts balance publicizing attacks to support anti-
IPS efforts (for example, in this work) against the possibility
that doing so might inadvertently help more attackers?
13
9 Conclusion
We have provided the first measurement study of the online
communities in which people enacting IPS discuss their tac-
tics. Through a mixed-methods study of five public forums,
including a Reddit subforum dedicated to infidelity, we de-
veloped a taxonomy of the IPS strategies attackers discuss
online. We showed that these forums are sites for both spam
advertising specific spyware products and organic discussion
of surveillance tools between users. We highlighted threads in
which (ab)users learn new IPS tactics from more tech-savvy
forum-goers, as well as cases where forums deter them from
conducting IPS. Our work is already impacting anti-IPS inter-
ventions by informing programs that directly assist victims.
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A Codebook
Our thematic analysis (see Section 5) resulted in the following
codebook:
Category Code
forum culture
"hacking"
do not use this hacker / tool
emotional advice
encouraging transparency
giving permission for IPS
moderation
norm enforcement
referring to another thread
technical advice
using slang
escalation
de-escalation
tools and tactics
accessing accounts / getting around passwords
accessing backups
accessing phone records / cellphone bills
accessing physical device
accidental surveillance
audiovisual recording / listening / watching
cloud / shared accounts
ways to get around 2FA / victims being notified
hacker / tool ad
location tracking
paid tools
reading emails / texts
remote attacks
social media accounts
search Google with these keywords
tracking browsing activity
tracking keystrokes / keylogger
Table 4: Codebook resulting from thematic analysis of IPS-
relevant forum postings (see Section 5).
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